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Abstract: The ubiquitous availability of devices such as smart phones, tablets, and other portable devices enables the collection of 
massive amounts of distributed data from the daily lives of citizens. These types of emerging mobile networks can provide new forms 
of valuable information that are currently not available on this scale via any traditional data collection methods. In such networks, 
price competition is the most important factor among the participants (mobile devices, Services Organizers and users) that highly 
affects their Quality-of-Experience (QoE). In this article, we first explain how a game theory model can depict social behavior, price 
competition and the evolutionary relationship among devices, Services Organizers (SOs) and users, and then we provide insights into 
understanding the price competition process of those participants in mobile networks. Finally, we outline several important open 
research directions. 
1. Introduction 
Mobile networks, which leverage the ubiquitous availability of devices such as smart phones, tablets, sensor 
nodes [1], and other easily portable devices, enable the continuous collection of a massive amount of distributed 
data, which can provide new forms of valuable information that are currently not available on this scale via any 
traditional data collection method [2]. In mobile networks, such devices are being manufactured with an increasing 
number of powerful embedded sensors in different categories (e.g., acoustic, sound, and magnetic vibration) [2]. 
Each device can sense and collect information directly from the surrounding environment and provide information 
services through mutual interaction, enabling a variety of new applications and services and playing a fundamental 
role in daily life. These devices, which directly sense information from the surrounding environment, are referred 
to as entities. Sensed information is a part of an information service called a simple service (SS). Because 
sometimes these simple services cannot be provided directly to a user (user), service organizers (SOs) are required 
to collect and organize these simple services (SS). SOs provide advanced services to users, such as VTrack [3], 
which provides omnipresent traffic information, and NoiseTube [4], which generates noise maps [4]. 
The organizers must pay for permission to collect and organize simple services, which the organizers can sell 
as an advanced service to users. In mobile networks, price competition is the core competition among entities, 
Service Organizers (SOs) and users. There are complex relationships in the price game. For SOs, the two main 
tasks are to collect simple services (SS) from entities and to organize SSs into more advanced services, thereby 
providing the user with a combination of high quality advanced services (AS). However, entities must pay (in time, 
energy, and storage space) for the perception and monitoring of the environment and for the collection of simple 
services. In general, SOs must pay entities to collect SSs from the entities, which incentivizes the entities to 
actively collect SSs to provide SOs with more simple services. The second task of SOs is to provide users with 
composite services (AS). After SOs gain access to collect and organize SSs, they can in turn profit by providing 
users with advanced services. 
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In this article, we argue that a game theory model can depict the social behavior of model Entities, Services 
Organizers and Users as well as price competition and evolutionary relationships between the participants. 
Moreover, we provide insight into understanding the price competition process of the participants of mobile 
networks. To illustrate this issue, we present different game methods and techniques to identify which game 
methods and techniques are suitable for those competition relationships. We find that a game theory model can 
depict different aspects of the behavior of the participants (including entities, SOs, users), and we discuss the 
technical challenges involved in developing and deploying such game methods. 
2 Price competition in Mobile Networks 
2.1. The composition of price competition in a mobile network 
With the rapid development of technology and application requirements, smart phones play an increasingly 
key role in the daily lives of citizens. As typical representative mobile devices, such as iPhone and Android smart 
devices, smart phones have experienced rapid development in their hardware configurations and software 
performance capabilities. Moreover, smart phone mobile devices generally carry several types of sensors, including 
image, voice, GPS, acceleration, distance, direction, light, and temperature sensors, which allow users to share 
useful contextual data at any time and represent potential sources of information sensing on a global scale. Such 
systems have been called participatory sensing systems (PSSs) [2] or Crowd sensing networks (CSNs) [2]. Smart 
devices have greatly expanded the scope of human perception and have changed the way people perceive the world, 
opening up many new application fields in the process. 
 
                      Figure 1. Illustration of the composition of a mobile network 
Fig. 1 shows the structure of a mobile network, which consists of entities, Service Organizers (SOs) and users. 
Entities refer to the individuals in possession of the sensing device(s) in Fig. 1. Entities can sense information from 
the surrounding environment at any time and report the findings to SOs through wireless (cable) communication. 
Instagram [2] and Foursquare [2], for example, are useful for monitoring large-scale phenomena and require the 
active involvement of people who voluntarily share contextual information and/or make available their sensed data; 
other examples include VTrack [3], which provides omnipresent traffic information, and NoiseTube [4], which 
constructs noise maps [4]. Because collecting SSs requires the consumption of energy, time, storage and other costs, 
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when an entity reports an SS to SOs, SOs pay the entity, which incentivizes the entity to collect more SSs. 
Although some entities provide SSs free of charge, free SSs are limited, which limits their usefulness to SOs. 
2.2. The form of price competition in a mobile network 
In a mobile network, there are three types of price competition: (1) price competition among entities; (2) price 
competition between entities and SOs; and (3) price competition between SOs and users. The new service system, 
based on a mobile network, has changed traditional price competition methods. In this new type of service system, 
entities are the source of the services and become the focus of the service system, i.e., an entity plays a key role in 
the system. At the same time, any entity can participate or withdraw from a service system at any time, which 
results in a degree of uncertainty in any given service. Because of these reasons, the price competition among 
Entities as well as between Entities and SOs are the most important of the three service system price competitions. 
 (1) Price competition among entities. Price competition among Entities is manifested in the following four 
forms: (1) price competition between Entities and SOs - Entities obtain SSs by directly perceiving the surrounding 
environment and are remunerated by reporting SSs to SOs. (2) Competition among Entities - The entity can buy 
SSs at prices lower than the price provided by SOs, which allows the entity to profit. For example, in the traffic 
information service system, entity A games with entity B; if they cooperate with each other in an interactive 
cooperation strategy, this interaction can be thought of as a cooperative game. Entities receive services by paying 
less than the service purchase price of the SOs and profit by reporting these services to SOs. However, the 
cooperator is paid for the service and does not profit in a cooperator-defector pair. Thus, in this new service mode, 
the situation among entities is very complicated and is characterized by a great deal of uncertainty. (3) Direct price 
competition among entities - In this type of price competition, an entity profits by providing another entity with 
services. (4) Price competition among entities through SOs - This type of price competition among entities refers to 
situations where some entities, such as entity A, requests a service from another entity through a platform that is 
provided by an SO. The service is not provided by SOs, but an entity that can provide such a service is noticed by 
SOs. Entity A games for services from those noticed entities. For example, in the mobile network, entity A requests 
another entity to complete a specific service to realize real-time ubiquitous pervasive computing. After SOs receive 
the request, they forward the service requests to entities that conform to the conditions. If the entity is willing to 
provide the corresponding service, price competition occurs among the entities through SOs. 
(2) Price competition between SOs and entities. Each SO invests in collecting and organizing services and 
constantly seeks more services at a lower cost to improve the quality of the combined services for the users (or 
customers) and to maximize its profit. Generally, the more SS an SO collects, the better quality of service (QoS) of 
the combined services provided by the SO. For example, when VTrack collects traffic information services, 
incomplete traffic information will affect the QoS to the user. Thus, when an SO collects more information, the 
quality of service that can be provided by VTrack improves and the accuracy of the traffic information obtained by 
users increases. However, the collection of too much information by SOs can be detrimental because obtaining the 
information requires payment, and the additional information beyond a certain point may not sufficiently improve 
the QoS for the price. The number of services can be controlled by adjusting the service price dynamically. SOs 
raise the service price to incentivize entities to provide more services when the SO desires more collected services. 
In contrast, when the SO desires fewer collected services, SOs can reduce the price of the acquisition of the service. 
In general, because information collection costs the SO (sometimes in services), entities seek to sell their services 
at the highest price and buy services at the lowest price (such as λ ). Based on these principles of supply and 
demand, a point of equilibrium can be reached for the service price between SOs and Entities. 
      (3) Price competition relationship between users and SOs. SOs profit by providing high-level services to 
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users; thus, a price competition relationship exists between users and SOs. User usually refers to the person or 
organization that consumes a service. In the emerging mobile networks, user and entity may be the same mobile 
device, as a mobile device can collect services to report to SOs as an entity and can consume services from SOs as 
a user [10]. 
2.3. The key issue of the price competition in a mobile network 
Researching the complexities of price competition can help SOs and entities choose the appropriate 
competition strategies and optimal prices to occupy the dominant position in the competition [7-9], [16]. For a long 
time, researchers have sought to establish a suitable model to depict the complex price competition system. The 
main problems for SOs include (a) the pricing problem of SOs. One part of the pricing problem is the pricing for 
entities. If the number of services SOs want to collect is ω , then for a given network, what price λ  should be 
set by the SOs when users provide a service? If the price λ  is too high, then the more services that are provided 
require more payments by the SOs, which could result in lower efficiency. Conversely, if the price is too low, then 
SOs may encounter difficulty in collecting sufficient services. Another part of the pricing problem is the pricing for 
users. Users order services that are provided by SOs, for which SOs charge a service price ζ  to the user. The 
determination of price λ  is not only influenced by price ζ  but is also influenced by the user. Thus, the 
appropriate pricing of ζ  is important for the survival of SOs. (b) Another problem for SOs is when the system 
becomes stable, how much is the total expected payment and payoff? (c) Furthermore, what is the number of 
services provided by entities with different strategies? When the SOs face a dynamic market, according to the 
different strategies, entities adopt effective pricing strategies that play an important role in price competition for 
SOs. 
For entities, the key issue of concern is the pricing problem of entities. The price of an entity refers to the 
payment γ  that they offer other entities that provide the service. SOs offer payment λ  to an entity when an 
entity reports a service to an SO. The price λ  stabilizes relatively quickly; the entity obtains little payoff if the 
service price γ  of the entity is too high, which results in the demise of the entity. If the service price γ  of the 
entity is too low, other entities have no incentive to interact with them, resulting in a disadvantage for the entity in 
pricing competition. Thus, setting a reasonable price is the first condition to ensure the survival of an entity. 
3 Game theory-based price competition between SOs and user 
3.1. Stackelberg Game Model for price competition between SOs and users 
    Price competition between sellers and buyers was previously studied by Walrand [10]. A similar price 
competition exists in mobile networks. SOs that provide services to users act as the sellers, whereas users who buy 
services are the buyers. Maximizing profit is the primary concern of SOs, which can be achieved by maintaining a 
high price level for users and a low amount of investment in the infrastructure. In contrast, users wish to maximize 
their utility by consuming high QoS at the lowest possible service price. The main price competition models are the 
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Cournot and Bertrand competition models [10]. In the Cournot model, SOs compete with each other to decide the 
extent of investment in their infrastructure. That is, SOs provide users with more comprehensive services mainly 
by buying more simple services (SS) and by investing in the infrastructure to allow the users to obtain faster and 
more convenient services. In the Bertrand model, SOs engage in price competition to attract more subscribers for a 
given infrastructure capacity. 
 Price competition exists between SOs and service users, and users will prefer to access SOs with better service 
quality and lower prices. Simultaneously, the SOs compete with each other to attract users. SOs seek a large 
enough customer base to pay for the cost of their investment. SOs must also consider the pricing strategies of their 
competitors when setting prices because users can choose a better service quality and price for an SO service 
request. Therefore, the characteristics of the interaction between SOs and users are a typical problem of the 
Stackelberg game [11]. For the analysis of the interaction behavior between a user and an SO, the Stackelberg 
game model can be used to depict the interaction behavior. There are two types of participants in the game: leaders 
and followers. An SO can be seen as a leader, who is the provider and owner of a service and a decider of the 
service price. The leader meets the service demand of the user by collecting simple services and influencing the 
service needs of the users through a price strategy to maximize its own utility. Each user is defined as a follower. 
SOs must pay to collect simple services from entities, and the quantity and quality of the collected service, as well 
as their investment in the infrastructure, will influence the service demand of the user. In other words, the 
correlation between the cost and profit of an SO can be represented by the utility function of the SO. For the user, 
the utility function of service demand quantity also exists. 
3.2. Trust Game Strategy for price competition between SOs and users 
A game mechanism based on credibility [12] is suitable for price competition between SOs and users. In the 
trust game model, SOs give a more preferential price to users with high credibility, which fosters “loyalty” from 
the user, to attract the user to achieve maximum profit. In a game based on trust, the following important issues 
need to be studied. (1) The credibility computation. In a price game based on credibility, the price is corrected 
based on the credibility function; thus, credibility computing reflects price changes. In a credibility game between 
SOs and users, the trust computation includes two aspects. One aspect is the SO-user trust computation, which 
influences the decision of the SO regarding which user with whom to play the game. The second is the user-SO 
trust computation, through which the user decides to choose which SO can service the request. (2) The choice of 
game strategy. 
(1) Evaluation of trust in users by SOs. In the trust model, there is considerable variation in the concept of 
trust. Trust can have different definitions in the context of different applications. Trust generally occurs in a 
distributed environment; some game participants practice fraudulent behavior in the game, which is 
disadvantageous to the honest entity. Thus, trust is often defined as whether a game individual complies with an 
agreed upon strategy in advance in the process of a game, whereas trusted behavior is defined as the behavior of 
the game strategy to comply with a contract in advance; participants who practice other behaviors are considered 
untrustworthy. Trust can be defined by the ratio of the number of trusted behaviors to the overall behavior over a 
period of time. Obviously, SOs offer higher preferential prices to users with high credibility; thus, SOs attempt to 
retain entrusted users to improve their earnings. In a trust-based game, SOs offer the user a trust value 
measurement based on historical records of user interaction. SOs can adopt the method of grading to evaluate every 
interaction with users and their behaviors. SOs give users more positive trust values if they show a higher level of 
trust in the process of interaction with the SOs. In contrast, SOs will give negative evaluations of trust if users 
show fraudulent behavior over the course of their interactions. Because the interaction behavior between SOs and 
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users at different periods of time do not have the same importance with respect to the evaluation trust value, in 
general, the closer to the current time of interaction, the more significance is attributed to the evaluation trust value. 
A forgetting factor is used by SOs to correct for the trust of a user based on time. The more distant an event is from 
the current time point, the smaller the forgetting factor will be. Likewise, greater weight will be placed on recent 
interactions to evaluate the credibility of the user. 
 (2) Evaluation of trust in SOs by users. 
In price competition, some SOs may be dishonest, and quality products offered by reputable SOs are limited; 
thus, selecting the most profitable SOs as transaction partners is challenging, especially when users lack personal 
experience with SOs. The game model based on trust evaluation can help users evaluate the credibility of SOs and 
then choose which SOs will provide a better quality of experience (QoE). From the point of view of the user, 
evaluating the credibility of SOs is more complex and diverse because SOs offer users different prices and qualities 
of service (QoS). Moreover, different users may receive different QoE. In a mobile network, the traditional method 
can also be used to evaluate the credibility of the SOs. For example, to evaluate the credibility of SOs by using  
user feedback, a user can increase the credibility of an SO if the user expresses that the SO provides high quality 
services; this is an example of a single rating system. 
Obviously, this trust evaluation method is also suitable for price competition between users and SOs. 
However, in this type of research, it is authentic to consider feedback information from the user. Notably, in real 
situations, a large amount of false feedback information exists. This trust evaluation method is also unsuitable for 
situations in which users do not report feedback. Dual reputation ratings systems can be used to evaluate the 
credibility of users and SOs. In this method, to report evaluations of transactions, both parties should submit ratings 
to the system after an interaction. If both parties are satisfied with the deal, the system will improve the credibility 
of the SOs. However, if the feedbacks are inconsistent with each other, indicating that at least one party could be 
lying, the system punishes both parties by reducing trust or prohibiting future interactions. The deficiencies in this 
type of feedback system include the fact that forcing both parties to submit ratings to the system is not feasible in 
actual mobile networks. Notably, the distributed mobile network has no credible rating system, and users and SOs 
have no obligation to submit ratings to the system. Moreover, in all systems that depend on feedback, the 
authenticity of the feedback information from the users and SOs cannot be ensured, facilitating cheating by 
collusion between malicious entities. These entities could enhance their own credibility by giving high mutual trust 
feedback values, which could not be recognized by the system. 
(3) The mechanism and strategy of trust games between SOs and users. 
Game models based on trust can also depict the price competition relationship between SOs and users, 
improving the QoE of the participants. In this model, each participant (SOs and users) is rational and hopes to 
maximize their own interests. Therefore, each participant will comprehensively consider various factors, such as 
the credibility of behavior, QoS, and overall QoE, thereby calculating the trust function of the game participants. 
For SOs, price λ  in the matrix of a game is a value that is associated with the trust function, and SOs 
dynamically adjust the price λ  as trust changes. For the user, the standards for choosing SOs may be the product 
of the provided price λ  and the credibility of the SOs. Each participant chooses another participant according to 
their desire to maximize their own benefit, but they will adjust their gains matrix on the basis of the strategy of 
their opponent in subsequent games to achieve Nash equilibrium. 
4 Game model insight into the price competition between SOs and entities 
There is a price competition relationship between SOs and entities because simple services are provided by 
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entities, SOs announce the acquisition price of simple services (SS), and entities obtain a payoff by reporting 
simple services to SOs. The price competition relationship between SOs and entities can be described by using the 
Bertrand price competition model [13]. The Bertrand model assumptions are as follows: (1) each SO competes by 
selecting a suitable acquisition price for an SS; (2) the produced advanced service is homogeneous; and (3) there is 
no formal or informal collusion behavior between the SOs. In price competition between SOs and entities, entities 
will report their simple services to the SO offering the highest purchasing price. The SO with the highest 
purchasing price will theoretically collect all of the SSs, whereas the other SOs would not receive any SSs. This 
would force the other SOs to increase their offered purchasing price for SSs to an extent that is limited by the 
marginal cost. After several rounds of the price game, the purchasing price of SOs tends to equal the marginal cost, 
which results in zero profit and is similar to competitive situations in real life. 
The Bertrand price competition model is often used to depict price competition among enterprises. Generally 
speaking, the price competition among enterprises does not completely satisfy the premise of the Bertrand model. 
The Bertrand model assumes that the production capacity of an enterprise is not limited, i.e., the production 
capacity can fully supply the market. However, the production capacity of an enterprise is limited and cannot 
supply the entire market; thus, the price may not be limited by the marginal cost. In the new service model of 
mobile networks, the production ability of an SO is not limited. However, the price competition between SOs and 
entities is also limited by the Bertrand model; another consideration is that the produced advanced service is 
completely substituted. In practice, advanced services produced by different SOs are not identical. In general, the 
more SSs received by SOs, the higher the quality of the service provided by the SO, which results in a higher price 
charged to the user. Thus, the marginal cost of the SOs is the utility function associated with the received number 
of SSs. The marginal cost promotes a high-level quality of service, and each SO eventually reaches a balance by 
participating in the game on the basis of an appropriate price. 
5 Game model - Understanding the price competition among entities 
5.1. Game Models based on trust for price competition among entities 
Trust-based price competition games among entities differ from the games between SOs and users. For 
example, in a Delay Tolerant Network (DTN), the DTN transports data depending on cooperation among the 
entities, thereby requiring cooperation among the entities and playing a significant role in the operation of the 
DTN. However, in such a system, an entity cannot always obtain direct benefits by helping another entity relay 
data, and the entity only obtains a payoff when the entity requires the system to relay data. The trust game 
mechanism is relevant to this type of system. The trust game mechanism provides that an entity can earn credits 
by cooperating with other entities or by helping others perform beneficial work. The entities use these credits in 
turn to obtain help from others. 
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Figure 2. The cooperation ratio of entities with credibility 
    Fig. 2 shows that the cooperation ratio of entity games involving entities with high credibility can be 
improved. The credibility of an entity will be low if the entity always betrays their opponents in the game and does 
not pay other entities in exchange for SSs. Therefore, this game can inhibit the behavior of an entity with low 
credibility in the process of a game involving an entity with high credibility. In the trust-based game mechanism, 
an entity chooses an opponent based on trust from high to low, which increases the chances of the entity obtaining 
the biggest payoff. The cooperation ratio of this system can be improved (see Fig. 2). 
5.2 Price competition based on auction by entities 
Price competition among entities can be depicted by using the auction game mechanism [14]. When entity A in 
S1 requests for S2 via SOs, this situation is similar to an asset selling problems for entity A. Many entities can 
provide this service in S2, arriving sequentially over discrete time slots (multiple entities can arrive in the same 
slot). These entities (offers) are independent and identically distributed (iid). As the offers arrive, each offer will 
provide their service price. Entity A has to decide whether to take an offer or wait for future offers. If entity A 
decides to accept the service at the current service price, the service price will be lower than later offers. 
Additionally, if entity A decides to wait for a future offer, then entity A pays a cost to consider the next offer. This 
cost includes time consumption and the value of important information, which is unknown due to the time delay. 
This cost can be represented as a growth function with respect to time loss. Therefore, the cost of entity A becomes 
larger in the process of waiting, which also increases the expectations by the entity for the following offer because 
previous offers cannot be recalled. The decision process ends with entity A either choosing an offer or not buying 
any service. 
5.3. Incentive Game Models for price competition among entities 
The incentive mechanism plays an important role in games among entities [15]. In mobile networks, due to 
limits in processing power, storage space, energy and other resources, an entity tends to be selfish, and selfish 
entities are usually not willing to cooperate with other entities, which will affect the function of the network. How 
to motivate selfish entities to improve the network performance is one of the major challenges for the current 
mobile network research field. 
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Figure 3. The cooperation ratio of entities with respect to service price 
The result of the experiment for a price incentive game is shown in Fig. 3. In this game, each entity adjusts 
the service price according to the payoff. SOs also adjust the service price depending on the amount of the total 
obtained service in the game. To obtain more payoffs in the game, the entity increases the service price when the 
total payoffs increase and when the corresponding game number of the entity increases, which increases the 
willingness of the entity to game with other entities. Thus, the entity can obtain more payoff due to the incentive, 
resulting in increased cooperation and an increased cooperation ratio in the game. 
Reputation systems can be used to depict the game among entities. Reputation can refer to the contribution of 
an entity to the network in the Delay Tolerant Network (DTN); the more data an entity relays, the better the 
reputation. Reputation can also represent the collaboration levels of the entities, whereby the cooperation ratio of a 
selfish entity would be low. Reputation can also represent other abilities of entities, such as the ability and the 
quality of sensory data. In the game model based on reputation, a system offers certain preferences to an entity on 
the basis of reputation, eventually involving the entity in a game and making the entity reluctant to deviate from the 
system game strategy; this results in the entity reaching the optimal equilibrium. The shortcomings of a 
reputation-based incentive mechanism are as follows: (1) this system works against a new entity that has just 
entered the system; (2) an entity could easily provide a good evaluation to another entity in collusion, which could 
increase the reputation of malicious entities; and (3) obtaining a fair evaluation is difficult using this system. 
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Figure 4. The cooperation ratio of the incentive mechanism 
   Fig. 4 shows that the incentive mechanism in games can improve the entity cooperation ratio. The total revenue 
of the entity increases due to the incentive mechanism, leading to an increase in the number of games and 
increasing the enthusiasm of the participants for the game. Thus, the entity becomes more willing to conduct the 
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game. Additionally, the number of games decreases for entities whose total revenue decreases, which results in a 
decrease in the number of betrayals in subsequent games. This results in an increased cooperation ratio. 
6 Potential research directions 
6.1. Tolerate failure mechanism of game among participants 
In the previous game mechanism, the participants either do or do not die to participate in the game when the 
total payoff of the participants involved in the game is 0. However, in practice, the death of the participants also 
tends to offer a certain probability to participate in a game and can often change the outcome of the game. For 
example, in real life, some entrepreneurs (SOs) may lose all of their investments but may take advantage of 
competition due to their own efforts and strategy adjustments. A similar situation can also occur between entities. 
As shown in Fig. 5, three lives can be given to an entity, i.e., three chances are given to an entity in a game in 
which the entity can “die”. The entity will be dead after using all three chances. When each entity is given three 
chances, the cooperation ratio significantly increased. This type of game strategy is in accordance with actual 
situations and is worthy of research. For example, how many resurrection opportunities should be provided to 
entities? What type of strategy should be amended to apply this observation to price competition in a mobile 
network? 
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Figure 5. The cooperation ratio of an entity with 3 lives 
6.2. The influence of network dynamics on the game 
In the trust game, an incentive game is completed based on memory game history. In a mobile network, the 
influence of the movement of participants for a game is worthy of research. Vainstein et al. conducted a 
preliminary experiment on the movement of participants. In the experiment, they randomly placed an agent on a 
2-D grid. A percentage of agents moved randomly to idle neighbors located in each generation. The agent system 
evolved into a game with their neighbors, whereby random moving produced the next generation. Interestingly, the 
study found that with the improvement of the mobile agent ratio, the system had a higher level of cooperation. The 
results of this research warrant further research of this concept in the context of a mobile network. 
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6 Conclusion 
Mobile networks have gained tremendous momentum in recent years due to the widespread proliferation of 
mobile devices (entities). These entities perceive the surrounding environment and report their findings to Service 
Organizers (SOs), who compose simple services and provide users with ubiquitous availability of network services. 
These participants (including devices, SOs and users) tend to compete with each other through price to improve 
their QoE. Theoretically, these relationships reveal that price dynamics in mobile communication services are of 
vital significance. 
Game theory has been used to model and analyze the price decision process of participants in a mobile network. 
Game theory models are useful for deciding on the price that will achieve maximum profit. In this article, we 
discussed different game models developed for price competition among SOs, entities and users. These models 
have been categorized based on objects in price competition. In these game models, the price competition between 
entities is the most complex. Trust-based games, incentive-based game mechanisms and auction-based game 
models are suitable for solving the price decision problems among entities. For the price competition between SOs 
and users, Stackelberg games and trust-based games can be used. The Bertrand competition model and improved 
game model can be used for price competition between SOs and entities. We also presented some experimental 
results to show the effectiveness of the game model. In this paper, we also outlined potential research directions to 
develop novel game theory models to solve price competition problems for mobile communication services. 
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